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Under the,\merican Rule, one
who prevails n a civil action is not
entitled to recover attomey fees ab-
sent a statute or contract provision
that specifically provides for them.1
Consequentl¡ few victrms of wrong-
doing who seek recompense in the
civil system are ever made whole.
Plamtiffs' attorneys know well the
irony of perpetually seekrng to obtarn
for their clients compensation that is
merely adequate while the corporate
media have the public believrng that
plaintiffs ur the civil system are win-
ners of a liability jackpot.
Justice requires an award of
attomey fees and costs in many insur-
ance cases especially where the insur-
arìce consumer, be she the insured or
the victim of the insured tortfeasor,
must engage lfr civil litigation to
obtain the benefit promised by the
insurer. That benefit may be first-
party medical coverage, a promise of
defense, indemnity, fire insurance
proceeds, uninsured motoris t cover-
age, or a host of other benefits for
which the insured bargarned to assure
security from risk. From the pornt of
view of the rnjured plaintiff, the
benefit may be the liability coverage
of the wrongdoer.
The law governing attorney fees
in actions against insurance compa-
nies is fat ftom uniform n the
United States. One state may deny
attomey fees outright to an insured
plaintiff who prevails in a coverage
dispute, while another awards attor-
ney fees outright in the same situa-
tion, and a third awards them only if
the insurer initiated the action and
not the insured. While I will, in this
article, refer to the general common
law rules as set forth in some of the
insurance treatises, the main focus
will be to review the law regarding
awards of attorney fees in cases
agarnst insurance cornpanies by rnsur-
ance consumers or third-party claim-
ants as developed by the Montana
Supreme Court.
Fo r tunately, Montana corrìrrìon
law recognizes equitable exceptions
to the American Rule,2 in cases in-
volvrng insurance. As can be seen in
the recent decisions of Mt. lYest
Fatm Buteau Mut. fns. Co. v
Brewet,3and Ttustees of fndíana
UnÍvetsÍty u Buxbaum,a the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has developed a
srgnificant remedial body of law that
can be used to obtain attorney fees
and costs in cases where civil litiga-
tion has been necessary to secure the
insurance benefit.
I7e might consider those cases in
categories: First, there are the refusal
to defend cases in which the insur-
ance comparìies flatly deny coverage
under liability policies ard, therefore,
refuse to defend their insureds from
the civil clarms for wrongdoing. In
those cases, the insureds suffer dam-
ages in the form of attorney fees
incurred n defending themselves.
Second, the insureds who are
refused defense may suffer another
distinct set of attorney fees, those
incurred in bringrng actions agarnst
the insurers for z declantion that the
insurers must defend or had the duty
to defend.
Third, there are the cases of the
insurers'refusal to indemnify the
insureds for the loss suffered ur
settlement or verdict. In such situa-
tions, the carriers may still undertake
defense under reservation of rights,
in effect warning the insureds that,
because of the insurers'perceived
lack of coverage or coverage dis-
putes, they may have no duty to pay
any resulting judgments or verdicts.
In those situations, the insureds must
assurne the insurers intend to pay
nothnrg and must anùyze whether it
is wise to let them continue in de-
fense under reservation of right.s In
such situations, the insured tort-
feasors may suffer attorney fees in
engaging in declaratory actions initi-
ated by them or their insurers to
determine coverage for indemnity. Or
the insureds may negotiate their own
settlements by assigning their rights
to indemnity to the rnjured claimants
who wrll bring third-pàrry declara;roty
or bad faith actions. In either case,
someofle is going to suffer attomey
fees and costs in securing the ndem-
ruty benefit from the insurers.
Fourth is the category of actions
brought under the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act6 to enforce any
promise of benefit made by the in-
surer, not just defense or indemnity.
In each case, the insured or a third-
party will likely hire an attorney and
expend attoffiey fees and costs in
forcng the carrier to pay the benefit.
The question is whether the carrier
can be made to pay tn those circum-
stâflces.
Frnally, there is the category of
"bad fairh" refusal of benefits in
which the insurer's act of refusing
benefits of any kind is deemed urrrea-
sonable or in some other way reflects
bad faith in making the decision to
refuse. This category has two sub-
categories, first-party cases and third-
pa(ty cases, which may be treated
differently when attomey fee awards
are at issue.
This artrcle will briefly examine
the way the Montana Supreme Court
has treated these categories in deter-
mrning whether insurance consumers
have the remedy of an award of
attomey fees and costs. The reader is
forewarned that the task of categoúz-
trg the cases is not as simple as it
seems, The decisions are not always
Pece 30 Tnrer TnBNos - Sumrvrnn 2003
;t1
clear on whether the proceeding to
determine coverage ot benefits was
of the nature of a declantory judg-
ment action. Also unclear may be
whether the attomey fees sought were
for defending the undedyrng tort
action or for bnnging or defending
the declaratory judgment action in-
volvrng the insurer and the theory on
which the court awarded the fees,
Attorney fees as compensatory
damages for refusal to defend the
first-party insured
Generally, when an insurer
wrongly refuses to defend, the in-
sured can recover the attorney fees he
expended in defending himself in the
undedying action on the theory that
such fees are direct damages caused
by the insurer's breach of contract.T
Later in this article I will discuss
whether the insured can recover attor-
ney fees and costs if he prevarls in a
declaratory action to secure the cover-
age and defense refused.
In Montana, the Supreme Court
has approved awards of attorney fees
suffered as a result of the insurer's
refusal to defend. For instance, in
1,967, the court awarded costs of
defense to State Farm's insured, Th-
ompson, in the case of St. Paul Firc
and Marine Ins. Co. u Thomp-
son.8 State Farm had refused to de-
fend Thompson in an indemnity
action brought against hrm by St.
Paul, the insurer for a jornt defen-
dant. As a result of the refusal, the
insured, Thompson, suffered dam-
ages n the form of attorney fees and
costs in defendng himself against
the clarm brought by his co-defen-
dant. Thompson filed a thitd-party
complaint against State Farm in the
indemnity action brought by St. Paul,
prevailed, and was awarded attorney
fees a¡rd costs. We should note that
Thompson's claim for attorney fees
against State Farm involved those
incurred in defending himself but
apparently not those incurred in
pleading and provrng his third-party
complaint.
In 1972, in lfome Insurance
Company u. PinskÌ Btothets, Inc.,e
Home Insurance Company paid its
insured, Montana Deaconess Hospi-
tal in Great Falls, $135,000 for the
loss resulting from a boiler explosion
at the hospital. Home then brought a
subrogation claim against the archi-
tects responsible for the hospital
remodeling project involvrng the
boiler. Ironicall¡ those architects
were also Home's insureds who de-
manded that Home defend them
against the subrogation claim. Home
refused defense. Ultìmately, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court uphetd the lower
court's summary judgment for the
architects on the ground that Home
could not subrogate against its own
insured rn the first place and had
wrongly refu sed coverage.
The architects sought attorney
fees and costs for breach of F{ome's
comprehensive liability policy for
failing to defend. The court held that
Home's refusal to defend "consti-
tuted a breach of contract even if
based on an honest mistake, thereby
rendering Home liable for defense
costs resulting from such breach."
This was so, even though there was
no coverage on the second and third
courits of the complaint. The court
found it impossible to segregate the
attomey fees involved in the covered
as opposed to uncovered clarms and
noted that Home was the "moving
parry" in the litigation causing its
insureds to expend fees in the subro-
gation action and resultrng cormter-
claim for breach of contract.
Accordrngl¡ the court remanded for
trial court determrnation of damages
that presumably could include all of
the insured's attorney fees.
Cleady this case stands for the
proposition that one can obtain attor-
ney fees suffered as compensatory
damages for the insurer's failure to
defend and the insured's resultant
necessity of defending himself Inter-
estingly, it is also a case in which the
insurer initiated an action n which
the parties litrgated the legal issue of
whether the insured could subrogate
against its own insured. In that re-
spect, it is a declaratory action in
which the insured likely was awarded
attomey fees involved tr seeking
coverage.
In the L984 decision of Truck
Insatance Exchange v Wolstad,lo
the insured, Äction Sales, was sued by
the personal representative of
Wolstad v¡ho was burned and died in
Board-certified experts in
all health-care disciplines.
: Available to review and testify
in medical negl¡gence cases.
30 years, 6,000 cases
Member, American College
of Legal Medicine
rney references statewide
o
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the explosion of a propane fumace
rn a pickup-carnper sold by Action
Sales. Truck Insurance Exchange
refused Action Sales any defense on
the ground that the explosion oc-
curred after the policy expired. Ac-
tion asserted that the "Completed
those for handling the declaratory
judgment action. The legal ground
for awarding attomey fees on the
declaratory judgment are not stated,
nor are the awarding of the fees the
subject of the dissents of Justrces
Weber, Gulbrandson and Shea.
âttomey fees in declaratory actions
involving insurance. In 1978, the
court, in Foy u Andetson,lT esrab-
lished that it could award attorney
fees in a declaratory action under its
inherent equity power. In that case,
njured plarntrffs, Foy and Gilreath,
Operations Hazard" ønd
'?roducts Hazatt'por-
tions of the policy pro-
vided occurrence type
coverage, because those
portions of the policy
were in effect when the
product was sold.
Action Sales retarned
its own counsel to defend
the wrongful death action
On appeel, the court upheld
the award of attorney fees in
the declaratory ecü¡on citing
its þower to grant compleüe
relief under its eguity power,"
brought clarms against
Anderson, the driver who
rear-ended them. A third
passeflger in the Gilreath
vehicle, I(aren Eggan, ap-
parently suffered some in-
jury but chosé not to bring a
claim. Driver Anderson
sought defense and indem-
nity from his insurer, Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange,
That counsel subsequently advised
TIE of a settlement offer from
Wolstad and demanded that TIE
either settle the case or uncondition-
ally assume the defense. TIE refused
to respond or defend. The company
also refused to respond to Action
Sale's later warning that rt planned to
enter into a consent judgment and
covenant not to sue with Wolstad for
ff225,000. TIE then filed the declara-
tory judgment action to determine
coverage, and the injured Wolstad, as
assþee of the rights of Action Sales
agarnst TIE, successfully established
coverage via summary judgment.
\)Tolstad and Action Sales then moved
to compel payment of the judgment
by TIE, and ,A.ctron Sales sought
attomey fees and costs.
The court cited the fact rhat
Action made repeated unsuccessfi;l
requests of Truck Insurance Ex-
change to assume the defense and
said, "In light of Truck's breach, we
find Truck liable for Action's atomey
fees and costs in defense of this
matter." The order simply states:
"Affirmed and remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for determinztíon of at-
tomey fees and costs." It isn t clear
whether this was a case in which the
court awarded both the attorney fees
suffered as 
^ 
conttact damage for the
insurer's refusal to defend as well as
Attorney fees incurred in prevail-
ing in first-party declaratory
iudgment actions for coverage
or benefits
Most Americafl courts have re-
jected attempts by rnsureds to obtain
their attorney fees in proceedrngs
under declaratory judgment statutes.ll
Nauonall¡ the majority rule refuses
zttoffiey fees to the insured in de-
clatatory actions over coverage.l2
Under the "New York Rule," the
insured cannot recover in the action
he rnitiates even if he prevads against
the insurer in enforcing coverage.l3
Nevertheless, nationally there is a
split of authority on recovery of
attorney fees n declaratory actions
over the insurer's duty to defend.ta If
the insured has to defend himself
where the insurer takes the legal
action to avoid coverage, and the
insurer is found to have wrongfully
refused coverage, courts do award the
ihsured attomey fees.15 Those courts
that deny the fees generally follow the
,{merican Rule that, absent statutory
or contractual provision, there can be
no recovery of attorney fees.16
(1) Under equity power to remedy
unfairness in a declaratory action
Montana has developed a signifi-
cant body of common law allowing
which refused. Anderson then
brought a declantory judgment ac-
tion against Farmers and included as
party defendant the unwilllng l(aren
Egg , who subsequently prevailed
on the court to dismiss her and award
her attorney fees incurred in getting
out of the declaratory action.
On appeal, the court upheld the
award of attomey fees rn the declara-
tory action citing its 'þower to grant
complete relief under its equity
power." The court found persuasive
the fact that Anderson made Eggan a
party defendant when she had no
intention of making a clatm and sard,
"If defendant Eggan is dismissed
from the case and not awarded attor-
ney fees, she will not be made whole
or retumed to the same position as
before plaintiff Anderson attempted
to bring her into the,lawsuit." Obvi-
ousl¡ Foy wasn't a fìrst-party insured,
but the case reflects the theory that
the court can, within its inherent
equity pov/er, award attorney fees rn a
declantory action involving insurance
in order to avoid unfairness.
(2) As "reasonable expenses
incurred by the insured at the
request of the insurertt
The Montana Federal District
Court awarded attotney fees to the
insured in a declantory action on the
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theory that his expenses in defendrng
the action were expenses incurred by
the insured at the request of the
insurer under the cooperation and
reimbursement clause of the policy.
In Amedcan States fns. Co. u
Angstman Motors, Inc.r7& a grart
truck at Havre was involved in a
collision during harvest that resulted
".American has, by naming him as
party defend ant, required that Johnson
make an appearance in a case which
involves only the dutìes of the op-
posrng carriers." The court deemed
the question of which carrier must
coverJohnson to be "collateral" to
the duties American owed Johnson
and ruled that his carrier must pay his
gatap:e liability policy or the
customer's personal auto policy
would cover the damage caused when
the customer neglþntly caused a
collision while drivin g a'loaner"
from Atkin Volkswagen. The plain-
tiff sued the defendant customer,
McClaffert¡ who tendered the suit to
Universal Underwriters Insurance
in injury to occupants of
an automobrle. At the trme
of the collision, the grarn
truck was the subject of an
uncompleted "sale," since
the truck was being used
on "approval," the buyer
had only paid half the price
in cash, and no title transfer
documents had been ex-
ecuted. Consequendy, a
dispute developed ovet
Johnson sought aütorney fees
from his insurer, Amet¡cen, on
the theory thet they were
feesoneÞle costs inc¡rrted et
ühe request of the compeny.
Company for defense.
Universal refused, and
McClafferty's personal
carcie4 Safecq defended
and settled the case. Mean-
while, Universal settled
with its insured gange for
a portion of the damage to
the "loafler," after which
Atkin Volkswagen sued
McClafferty on behalf of
itself and Universal to
whether the buyer Johnson's insuter,
American States, or the dealer's in-
surer, USF&G, would have primary
liability. The buyer's insurer, Ameri-
can States, sued USF&G and its ov¡n
rnsured, Johnson, in a declantory
judgment action in federal court to
determine which canier had primary
responsibility. The court ruled that
the truck still belonged to the dealer,
that the dealer's insurer, USF&G had
primary coverage, and that American
States had excess coverage.
Johnson sought attomey fees
from his insureE American, on the
theory that they were reasonable costs
incurred ât the request of the com-
pany. Johnson based his claim on the
policy clause that provided that his
insurer would reimburse him for loss
of wages or salary in corurection with
his attendance at hearings or trials
and "to pay all reasonable expenses
which the insured incurs at the re-
quest of American." The court
awarded Johnson the attorney fees
reasoning that American had named
him a party ur: a dispute that really
only affected the two carriers. The
issue wasn't whether he had coverage,
but which of the two carriers had
primary liability. The court said,
attorney fees. The court said,
"Johnson is entitled to recover reaszr¿-
able zttorney fees under the theory of
Standard AccÍdent fns, Co. of
Detroit u lfuil,91 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.
Cal. 1950)." It is rnterestrng that in
other jurisdictions this theory that the
insured's attorney fees are incurred at
the request of the insurer and reim-
bursable under the expenses clause
of the policy is roundly rejected and
has been chancteitzed as "manifestly
unreasonable" by Wmdt.le This hold-
ing of the Federal Court in Montana
does not appea;r to be supported by
any Montana Supreme Court authority.
One could formulate from the
Angstman Motots case a rule that,
where the dispute is between carriers,
and the insured is entitled to defense
and indemnity ir ary event, he
should recover attomey fees if he is
mzde a party to a resultìng declara-
tory judgment action.
On the other hand, in BíII AtkÍn
Volkswagen, fnc. u. McClaffetqr,2o
the court refused to grarit attomey
fees in an action brought to deter-
mrne which of two auto carriers had
prímary coverage liability and which
was excess. In Atkin Volkswage4
the issue was whether the dealer's
recover the damage suffered to the
"loafler." McClafferty sued Universal
by third-party complaint clarmrng to
be Universa.lt insured and sought to
recover Safeco's money paid to the
plaintiff, Ogrin. McClafferty also
sought attorney fees and costs under
the law of lfome Ins. Co. u Pínski.
The Montana Supreme Court
held that Universal's coverage of the
"IoÀnef'was mandatory but that the
two carriers would be pro rata re-
sponsible for primary coverage. Hav-
rng so held, the court refused
McClafferty's request for attorney
fees and costs. The court found dis-
tinguishing the fact that Pinskí tn-
volved a suit by the insurer against its
own insured, which the court in
Atkín Volkswagen described as "a
wrongfrrl attempt by an insurance
company to bring an action which
violates basic equitable principles of
sound public policy." The court said
of Atkin, "This is essentrally a suit
berween two insurance companies to
determine which of ¡,¡¡o applicable
ovedapping policies provides cover-
^ge'"It appears from reading the
decision that actions taken by
McClafferty may have been taken by
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his insurer in his name for the benefit
of insurer and client. This was not a
case in which the insured had to de-
fend hrnself in the face of a refusal
to defend; to defend a declatatory
action brought by his nsurer agamst
him; or to bring a declaratory action
to force his insurance carrier to de-
fend or indemnif'. In short, if the
action involves a coverage dispute
between two carriers, neither will be
awarded attorney fees.
(3) As remedy for wrongful
conduct of the insurer
In Líndsay DtiIIíng & Con-
ttactÍng u. United States FidelÍty
and Guatanty Co.r" USF&G re-
fused to defend its insured, Lindsay
Drilling, on claims that the company
salted core samples to make it appear
that certain mining properties con-
tained more minerals than in fact
existed. In a case filed under the Uni-
form DeclaratoryJudgment Act by
Lindsay Drilling the District Court
held for USF&G. F{owever, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the counterclaim alleging the
salting did state claims covered by
USF&G's policy. The court held the
insurer "liable for reasonable attorney
fees, expenses and court costs occa-
sioned thereby" cit:ng lfome Insut-
ance Company u PÍnskÍ Brothers,
Inc.The court's stated basis for the
award was that"Ir was USF&G's
wrongful refusal to defend Lindsay
which led to this âction." The case
was remanded for determination of
the attomey fees, expenses and costs.
It appears that the attomey fees in
question were those involved in the
declaratory judgment action brought
by the insured. Simply put, LÍndsay
DdllÍngfrts under the insurance
exception to the American Rule.
(4) Where the insured is required
to defend a "frivolous or
malicious" declaratory action
brought by the insurer
In Goodovet u LÍndey's, Inc.n
tfl 1992, the court, as a prerequistte to
an award of attomey fees in a de-
claratory action that didnt involve
insurance, required that the prevailing
party show he was "forced into a
frivolous lawsuit and must incur at-
tomey fees to dismrss the claim." This
was the "frivolous or malicious ac-
tion" requirement for obtaining an
award of attomey fees. Arguabl¡
because Goodovetwas not an insur-
ance case, its law would not apply in
an insurance declaratory action. How-
ever, in 2001, the court applied the
"frivolous or malicious action" re-
striction in an insurance rnteqpleader
action n NatÍonal Cas. Co. u
Amedcan Bankerc fns. Co. of
Flodda,ts There, Summers, a home-
owner insured his premises with Na-
tional Casualty intending to replace
his American Bankers policy. How-
ever, through some error, he paid
premiums and kept both policies rn
effect. When his place burned, a dis-
pute arose over which carrier was
primary under the "other insurance"
clause. 
'{merican Bankers paid the
insured's loss, while National Casualty
nterpleaded its benefrt naming
American Bankers and Surnmers in
the declaratory action. American
Bankers prevailed in its claim to the
fire insurance proceeds interplead by
National Casualty Company. How-
ever, the court refused Americân
Banker's request for attorney fees and
costs on the ground that the action of
National Casualty was not "frivolous
or malicious."
l7e can conclude that, if the in-
surer involves the insured in a de-
clantory action that is "frivolous or
malicious," the insured can invoke the
insurance exception to the American
Rule and will be entrtled to attomey
fees. However, the corollary that the
insured's request for attomey fees
must be based on "frivolous or mali-
cious" conduct of the rnsurer in
bringing the declaratory action may
not be true. Under the recently de.
cided case of Ttustees of fndÍana
IInívercÍty v Buxbaurn, (2003)'z4 the
"frivolous or malicious" standard is
abandoned if the attorney fees are
sought under the "supplemental re-
lief" provision of the Uniform De-
claratory Judgement Act, S 27-8-313.
The remedy of award of attorney
fees under that provision only re-
quires a showing of "necessary or
proper," and the parameters suggested
by the court as guidelnes for that
standard dort't appear to require any
showng of "ftivolous or malicious."
Attorney fees for prevailing
against a self-insured party on
covefage
In Ttustees of fndiana UnÍver-
sÍty u Buxbaum,2s the sued party
who sought defense and indemnity
coverage from Indiana University and
prevailed in the coverage dispute filed
by the University was confronted
with multrple problems in recovering
attoffiey fees. First, Indiana Univer-
siry was self insured, so it was not an
insurance company and did not have
an insurance policy contract with the
party demanding defense. Accord-
ingly, the insurance exception to the
American Rule did not apply to pro-
vide a legal basis for attorney fees.
In the case, three Indiana stu-
dents and another Indiana resident
were involved in the rollover of a
Chevrolet Suburban owned by Indi-
ana University ând operated rn Mon-
tarr on â sufiuner research proiect.
Three deaths and a serious injury
resulted. In the ensuing lawsuit, the
estate of the driver, Jones, demanded
defense and rndemnity from Indiana
University as a self-insurer. Multiple
issues developed regarding the
University's duty to indemnify the
responsible driver, the University's
stahrs as an insurer, and coverage.
Indiana University brought a declan-
tory action against the Jones estate
and the estate of deceased passenger,
I(rueger, to resolve the issues.
After denying cross motions for
summary ludgment, the court heard
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the rnatter rn non-jury trial and found
for the estates over the University of
Indiana. The yudge awatded the es-
tates their costs, expenses, and attor-
ney fees but later altered the
judgment to delete those amounts on
the ground that there was flo contrac-
tual or stahltory basis for their av¡ard.
Though the court found an award of
attorney fees to be within its equi-
table power under the 1978 case of
Foy u Anderconi6 it also found the
University's action did not meet the
"frivolous or malicious action" re-
striction placed on that equitable
pou/er to award attomey fees as set
forth in National Cas. Co. u.
American Bankerc.z1 There berng
no basis fot an âttorney fee award
under an insurance exception, the
estates argued that the Uniform De-
claratory Judgment Act provided for
attorney fees.
Consequently, the sole issue on
appeal was whether the District
Court erred when it denied the Pre-
vailing estates their attorney fees. The
estates argued that the court could
award attorney fees as "costs" under
S27-B-311 of the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgments Act, since $27-8-311
provides for recovery of "costs" in
the following language: "In any pro-
ceeding under this chapter the court
may make such awatd of costs as
may seem equitable and just." The
estates further argued that the attor-
ney fees could be awarded as
"supplemental relief" under $27-8-
313 of the ,\ct, which provides:
Further relief based on a de-
clarztory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever nec-
essary or proper. The applica-
tion therefore shall be by
petitron to a court having ¡uris-
diction to grant the relief. If
the application be deemed suf-
ficient, the court shall, on rea-
sonable notice, require any
adverse party whose rights
have been adjudicated by a
declaratory ludgment or de-
cree to show cause why fur-
ther relief should not be
granted forthwith.
One problem with any theorY
based in the UDJA was that the Mon-
tana Supreme Coutt had exPlicitlY
stated in 1978 in State ex rel. Dept.
of lfealth and Enuitonmental
Sciences v Líncoln Countyr2s trr
1994ln Mcl(amey u Statele and in
1998 in Dotwart u CanawaY,3o that
there is no provision for an award of
attomey fees in a declaratory judg-
ment action. This may seem surpris-
ing given cases like LÌndsay Drilling
mentioned above where the insureds
recoveted attomey fees in declaratory
actions to secure defense from their
insurers. However, those recoveries
were premised on the insurance ex-
ception to the American Rule and not
on any provision of the UDJA. Con-
sequently, in Indiana UnivercÍty, the
court had to reevaluate its position
and analyze u¡hether attomeY fees
were awardable under theories that
they were "costs" under $27-8-3Lt or
"supplemental relief" under $27-B-
31.3.
The court's review of precedent
cleady established that attorney fees
are not included in "costs" in Mon-
taîa afld hence, not available under
527-8-311. Flowever, the court held
that attomey fees could be awarded
as "supplemental relief" under $27-
8-313 if the court determrned that
they were "necessary or proper"
within the language of the statute. In
order to arcíve at that result, the court
overruled the Líncoln CountY'
McKamey and Dotwart cases inso-
far as they rndicated attorney fees
could not be recovered in declaratory
actions.
The court then wresded with
what it termed the nebulous nature
of the words "necessary and proper"
to "articulate some tangrble patam-
eters" in awarding attomey fees and
costs. To do so, the court reviewed
the Ohio Appellate Court's 1999 case
of McConneII u lfant SPorrc
Ent37 to arrive at the followng
guidelines or parameters:
1. Attorney fees are appropriate rn the
"anomalous resulC' circumstance
in which, without an attorneY fee
award, the insured "would have
been worse off than if a declan'
tion of their rights had never been
made." For instance, if the insured
doesn't receive attomey fees ln the
declaratory action and has to bring
abzd furh suit to be made whole,
it is an anomalous result.
2. Attorney fees are appropriate tn
declaratory actions when no other
alternative is available. If the
insured must file z declatatorY
action to obtain the benefìt of the
ihsurance, then attorney fees are
necessary and proper.
3. On the other hand, if the declata-
tory action is filed "for PurelY
tactical reasons," attorney fees may
not be appropriate.
Technically, one could argae that
fndíana IJnívetsityis not about
insurance but declaratory iudgment
actions. However, the court used the
case to provide an attorney fee rem-
edy against a self-insurer one week
and cited the case âs a means to pro-
vide attomey fees to a Prevailing
third-party in an insurance declara-
tory action, MoantaÍn West Fatm
Buteau Mut. fns. Co. u Btewet3z
the next week. In Btewet, the court
declined to expand the Insurance
Exception to the American Rule to
include âttorney fees for third-party
claima¡rts who had no contractual
relationship with the insurer nvolved.
However, the court asserted that its
holdurg "does not leave the
Christensons without recourse in
their attempt to recover their attorney
fees." The court cited the recently
decided Trustees of Indíana Uní'
vercÍty case and said, "$27-8-313,
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MCA, authorizes a court to award
attomeys fees when the court, in its
discretion, deems such an award
'necessary and proper."'The court
remanded Brcwet to the District
Court for a determination of whether
attomey fees and costs \¡/ere "neces-
sary or proper," and in what amount.
In essence, IndÍana UnívetsÍty
ptovides an additronal theoretical
basis for an award of attorney fees in
a case that will not fit under the in-
surarìce exception. The legal import
is clear rnsofar as the rulng will allov¡
âttomey fees where the third-party
has prevailed in the declaratory action
against the insurer. That is a sþif,r-
cant incentive for the injured third
party who is tempted to file his own
declaratory ¡udgment action.
Attorney fees for refusal to
indemniff the first-party insured
Until recentl¡ the court awarded
attomey fees ln liability coverage
disputes only in those cases of failure
to defend. The court would not
award such fees for failure to mdem-
nify. The court historically distin-
guished between the insurer's refusal
to defend, for which it would allow
fees, and the refusal to indemnify for
which it would not. In YouÍsh u
UnÌted Setuices Auto. Asstnr33
USAÂ had refused to rndemnify and
the nsured successfirlly established
right to indemnity in a declaratory
action. In refusing the prevarling
insured's plea for attomey fees, the
court acknou¡ledged the anfrciality
of the distinction berween refusrng
defense and refusng indemnity but
said, "[t]he legislature, not the courts,
must remedy the wrongs created by
this situation." Given the Montana
Legislature's reticence to grânt con-
sumer remedies agarnst insurance.
companies, continued adherence to
that principle of deference would
have prevented any expansion of
attomey fee awards.
Such was the state of Montana
law when the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked to Montana law to
decide Troatt u Colorado Westetn
Ins. Co.3a in 2001. In Ttouft,rhe
insurer agreed to cover the insured
tavern owner, Troutt, for liability
caused by injury arising out of the
sale, service or furnishrng of alcohol.
The clarmant, Engstrand, had most
of his fingers amputated when he
and others were using a mechanical
log splitter behind the tavern pre-
mises. Dudng the insurer's investiga-
tion of Engstrand's claim, no
disclosure was made to the insurer by
witnesses that alcohol was involved.
Neither did the pleadings make any
such allegation. It became app rent zt
the undedying trial, which the carrier
had refused to defend, that the
tavern's alcohol was signiflrcantly
rnvolved ln the accident. Conse-
quentl¡ after the facl rhe United
States District Court decided, and the
Nnth Circuit affirmed, that the car-
rier did have a coverage oblþtion
but did not fail to investigate or
wrongfully refuse to defend. Look-
ing at Montanalaw, the Circuit
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Court followed Youish affitming
that there could be no attorney fees
for a wrongful failure to provide
coverage absent a breach of the duty
to defend.
Fornrnately, the court recently
reassessed its deferral to the legisla-
ture in the salutary decision of
Mountain West Fatm Burcau Mut.
Ins, Co. u Btewet3s There, the
court expanded the insurance excep-
tion to the American Rule to include
attomey fees expended in establishing
a duty to indemnify. In doing so it
overturned Youish. The court cited
Pence u Fox(1991)136 for the prin-
ciple that "[t]he courts have the re-
sponsibility to reform common law
as justice requires." Because Youish
also rnvolved the question of àttor-
ney fees to secure indemnity, its rule
of legrslative deference was an im-
pediment to any ludicial expansion of
the attomey fee remedy in Brewe4
so that the court overruled it. The
court expressly reiected the "transpar-
ent" distinction between an ìnsurer's
refusal to defend for which the com-
mon law allowed attomey fees, and a
challenge to existence of coverage for
indemnity for which the courts tradi-
uonally have refused attorney fees.
Consequently the court said, "v/e
hold that an insured is entitled to
recover attorfley fees, pursuant to the
insurance exception to the ,\merican
Rule, when the insurer forces the
insured to assume the burden of
legal action to obtain the full benefit
of the insurance contract, regardless
of whether the insurer's duty to de-
fend is at issue." While the benefit at
issue in Btewerwas clearþ the duty
to indemnify, it is lnteresting to note
the breadth of the holding which
would appear to apply "when the
insurer forces the insured to assume
the burden of legal action to obtarn
the full benefit of the insurance con-
tract, regardless of whether the
insurer's duty to defend is at issue."
Does the holding apply to any benefit
or just the benefit of indemnity? Are
"benefit" and "indemnity'' rnter-
changeable in this context, since an
insurance benefit ndemnifres the
insured for loss? The language is not
restricted, and the court could easily
have limited the award to legal ac-
tions to obtain defense or indemnity.
The problem being remedied in the
holding is forcng the insured "to
assume the burden of legal action to
obtain the full benefit of the rnsur-
ance contract." That problem exists
in many situations where the benefit
is neither defense nor indemnity.
Predictably, the insurers will take the
position that Btewet applies only to
refusal to provide indemniry to a
first-parry insured. It temains for
insurance consumer counsel to estab-
lish the limits of this very important
case.
The quest for attorney fees in the
third-party action for indemnity
On occasion, when the insured's
liability catrier disputes coverage so
as to deny indemnity, it is the injured
third-party plaintiff who has the most
urgent interest in securing a court
determination of coverage. For in-
staflce, the first-party insured ma¡ by
reason of insolvenc¡ have nsuffi-
cient interest to expend his own
money for attorney fees and costs in
securing the coverage denied by the
insurer. In such a-case, the injured
third-party may have to assume the
burden of forcing a coverage deter-
mination. The rnvestment may be
risky, because the carrier's evaluation
ié that there is no coverage, and the
court may agree. In fact, the addi-
tional risk likely falls on the plaintiff's
lawyer who often undertakes the
work of coverage enfotcement under
the standard contingent fee agree-
ment as part of the undedying tort
claim. Nevertheless, because the
,\merican Rule applies rn the undedy-
ing tort case, it is in the plaintiff
client's interest to recover reasonable
attorney fees and costs if he or she
prevails in the declaratory action in
the ever-necessary effort to be made
whole.
In MountaÍn West Fatm Bu-
teau Mut fns. Co. u Btewet31 rhe
parents of the injured minor passen-
ger, Angie Christenson, successfully
pressed the third-party declaratory
action to enforce coverage by Moun-
tain V7est. Havmg prevailed, they
sought attorney fees and costs under
dual theories that (1) the insurance
exception to the American Rule
should be expanded to provide attor-
ney fees to an rnjured third-party who
prevails in an insurance coverage
action against a motor vehicle insurer,
and Q) the "supplemental relief"
provision3s of the Uniform Declara-
toryJudgment Act allows art awzrd
of attorney fees to the third-party
prevailing in such a declaratory ac-
tion.
As reported above, the court in
Btewet agreed that the insurance
exception to the American Rule
should be expanded to provide for
attomey fee awards rn declaratory
actions for ndemnity. Flowever, the
court declined to expand the excep-
tion to nclude declaratory actions on
indemnity brought by third-party
claimants. The court noted that their
decision expandng the insurance
exception to indemnity determina-
tions rested almost entirely upon
authority found rn first-party cases.
The court considered the absence of
the traditional conttactual relation-
ship in third-party cases and found
there was no exploitation of inher-
ently unequal bargaintng power in
such situations, nor was there frustra-
tion of any "justiFrable expectation
of insurance protection" held by the
injured third-party. Moreover, the
court refused Christenson's conten-
tion that, by enacting compulsory
motor vehicle liability insurance, the
legrslature set a public policy to "ex-
tend the right to enforce the insur-
ance contract to injured persons, not
just insureds" thereby raising a justifi-
able or reasonable expectation on the
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part of the third pafty ot creating a
sort of third-party beneficial interest
in the coverage. This holding is con-
sistent with other jurisdictions. Even
when tort plaintiffs who are named
as party defendants by insurers seek-
ng a determrnation that there is no
coverage prevail to win coverage,
they are held not to be entitled to
their attorney fees.3e
Ironically, therefore,
Christenson's crowning achievement
of extendurg attorney fee awards to
declaratory actions for indemnity in
the Brcwet case did not apply to
Christenson's own third-party claim.
Justice Trieweiler dissented from that
result on the ground that distinguish-
ing between first-party and third-
party on the issue of whether the
comparìy has a duty to indemnity is
arafrciaJ. Fortunately, the court did
not leave Christensons without tem-
edy regardtrg attorney fees, but
agreed they could be avarlable, rn the
court's discretion, under Christefl son's
second theory of "supplemental
relief " under the Uniform Declan-
toryJudgments Act.4 The court cited
fndiana Univercity and remanded
the case for ahearingon whether the
attomey fees were "necessary and
propef" under the "supplemental
relief" provision, S27-B-313 MCA.
All's well that ends well!
Attorney fees for bad faith
refusal of benefits
Several jurisdictions have
awarded attorney fees where the
insured has prevailed in a coverage
action and the insurer acted in bad
faith in refusing the coverage.al This
exception applies where the "con-
duct of the insured in refusing a
defense reflects fraud, bad faith, or
stubborn litigrousness ."4 The rule in
the 1985 California case of Btandt
u SupetÍor Court,a3 states the
theory best:
When an insurer's tortlous
conduct reasonably compels
the insured to retain an 
^ttor.-
ney to obtain the benefits due
under a polic¡ it follows that
the insurer should be liable in
a tort action for that expense.
Unfortunately, in 1986, n Tyne
u Bankerc Life Co,r4 the Montana
Supreme Court said of that quote,
'qü/e have not adopted this policy in
Montana and do not choose to do so
today." The court vacated a District
Court award of roughly $20,000 in
attomey fees assessed against Bank-
ers Life for the company's failure to
pay apptoximately $50,000 in medical
bills. Banker's conduct in the case
ncluded excessive and repeated de-
lays in nvestigation, failute to make a
timely coverage determination,
changrng determinations ofl coverage,
and providrng to a treatment center
written confirmation of coverage and
then revoking coverage while the
insured was in treatment for severe
psychosrs. The jury's award or
$100,000 damages for emotional
distress and $200,000 in punitive
damages reflects the wrongful nature
of Banker's conduct in the case. Nev-
ertheless, the court dechned to adopt
an award of attorney fees for bad
faith conduct.
In essence, until the recent deci-
sion in Btewe4 claims for benefits
other than defense were claims for
"indemnity" for which an insured
could not recover attomey fees aftet
prevailing in a declantory action.
Now, with Btewet's rule expanding
the right to attorney fees to those
cases where the insured establishes
the right to "indemnity'' (i.e., reim-
bursement of any money loss), there
is arguably a basis for allowing attor-
ney fees rn an rndependent tort action
for bad faith.
This issue may be complicated by
the fact that rn 1987, the Montana
legrslature intended to corral all po-
tential claims for bad faith refusal of
benefits under one statute, the "Inde-
pendent Cause of Action" of MCA
533-1,8-242. The statute doesn't men-
tion attorney fees, but provides rn
pertinent part as follows:
(1) A" insured or a third-party
claimant has an independent
cause of action aganst an m-
surer for âctual damages
caused by the insurer's viola-
tron of subsection (1), (4), (5),
Íulf),or (13) or 33-1.8-20L.
(4) In an action under this sec-
tion, the court or Jtxy mzy
award such damages as were
proxrmately caused by the vio-
Iation of subsection (1), (4),
(5), (6), (9), or (13) of 33-18-
20L. Exemplary damages may
also be assessed in accordance
wiú 27-1.-221,.
Based on prior case law, it seems
quite certarn ¡haf "ac[sal damages"
under the statute would have to nclude
the insuredt costs of defense in cases
where the insurer, actrng in bad faith,
has tefused defense. Are the attorney
fees expended tr engaglng in a success-
firl effot for court declaration of cov-
erage " actual damaçs" recoverable
r¡nder the statute? Are altorney fees
expended n enforclng coverage 'þrox-
mately caused" so as to be proper for
award nnder 533-1.8-242 (4)? Those
issues remain to be resolved.
Attorney fees for third-party
bad faith claims
In Mottis u Nationwide Ins.
Co.ras Morirs, a rancher, brought a
third-party action agarnst Nationwide
Insurance Company for its breach of
the Unfair Claims Settlement Prac-
tices Act6 for its conduct in conduct-
ng negotrations in Morris's fire
damage claims agarnst its insured,
Sun River Electric Co-op. The trial
court instructed the jury that, if they
found Nationwide violated its duty
under the statute, they could award
"all losses proximately caused
thereby" and that such award "shall
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rnclude . . . ,\ttomey fees and costs
incurred in prosecuting the lawsuit
against Nationwide's insured, Sun
River Electric Co-op." The only issue
on appeal was whether the court
erred in restrictrng the attorney fee to
the percentage contingent fee agreed
between plaintiff and his lawyer or
whether it should have been the
much larger reasonable fee calculated
on an houdy basis. What appears not
at issue in the case is the premise that
attomey fees in trying the undedyrng
case are recoverable damages where
the insurer has engaged in bad faith
breach of the UTPA by such conduct
as failing to attempt to effectuate
p(ompt and fatt settlement. This case
preceded the "Independent Cause of
Action" statute of 1.987. One can
assert that the case provides authority
for the proposition that attorney fees
incurred rn trying a third-party bad
faith claim for failure to negotiate
should be ncluded in the "actual
damaçs" referred to in the statute.
Moreover, based on ¡he 1.999
Btewington u Employets Firc Ins.
Co.a7 decision, third-party corrunon
law bad faith is sull alve in Montana.
Consequentl¡ in such cases, MoÍtis
is authority for recovering the attor-
ney fees from the undedying action.
Conclusion
The Montana Supreme Court has
developed a srgnif,rcant set of attor-
ney fee remedies in cases in which
insured consumers or third-party tort
victims prevail in legal actions to
establish coverage and right to de-
fense or indemnity. Under basic con-
ftacT.law,when the insurer refuses
defense, the insured is entitled to
recover his costs of defense of the
undedying action as compensatory
damages for breach of contract. A
first-patty insured carl recover attor-
ney fees under the insurance excep-
tion to the Ämerican Rule when he
prevails n a declaratory action estab-
lishing coverage for defense or for
indemnity. Though a third-party in-
sured cannot recover attorney fees
under the insurance exception when
he prevails in a declaratory action to
establish coverage for defense or
indemnity, he can recover such fees
under the "supplemental relief" pro-
visions of the UDJA if the attorney
fees are deemed "necessary and
proper" by the court. A party estab-
lishing coverage for defense or in-
demnity agaurst a selfl-insurer can
also recover attorfley fees under the
"supplemental relief" provisions of
the UDJA even absent an insurance
corìt(act or an "insurer." The first-
pârty msured can make a case lhat
any "independent cause of action"
under $33-18-242 should nclude in
"acf:taf damages" allowed the attor-
ney fees incurred in enforcing the
insurer's promises. The third-party in
zbad faiú action also can make the
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case for recovery of attorney fees
incurred as a result of the carrier's
bad faith conduct.
The continued development of
the remedy of attorney fees in cases
agarnst insurers will help resolve the
problem of insurers denying claims
based on the simple economics of
saving money by failing to pay claims.
The powerful attorney fee remedy
makes it possible to take on cases for
insurance consumers that would
otherwise lack financial viability.
Review of the Montafla Supreme
Courtt holdings on attomey fee re-
covery in insura¡rce cases as com-
pared to the general corrìtnort law in
the United States reminds one to take
a minute to feel gratitude for the level
playng field we enjoy in Montana
and the care with which this court
crafts its decisions for justice. r
1. Mt. W Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v
H^11,2001.\{if 314,308 Mont. 29, 38
P.3d825.
2.rd.
3. 2003 MT 98, 315 Molt 23I,69P.3d652.
4. 2003 \,tfT 97,69 P.3d 663.
5. See, Munro, The Insurer Reservation
of Rights Iætter ancl the Duty to De-
fend, TRIALTRENDS, Surnmer 2001,
for a frrll treâtment of insure/s defetse
rurder reservation o[ riglrts.
6. MC,A. $27-8-101 et. seq. (2001).
7. Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile
Liability Insurance vol. 2, $29.08 (3tl
ed., Clark, Boatdrnan, Callaghan 1995).
8. 150 Morrt. 1.82,433 P.2d795 (1967).
9. L60 Mont. 2I9,500P.zd945 (1'972).
I0. 2I2 Mont. 418, 687 P2d 1022 (1984)
IL Batry R. Ostrager and Thomas R.
Newman, Handbook On Insurance
Covetage Disputes, $5.05þ), (l1th ed.,
Aspen L. And Bus. 2002).
t2.td
13. Id.
74. rd.
15. rd.
16. Id.
1?. 176 Mont. 507, 580 P.2d ll4 7978).
18. 343 F. Supp. 576 pist. Mont.1972).
19. Alan D Windt, Insurance Claims
and Disputes vol. 2, $8:14 (4th ed.,
West 2001).
20.213 Mont. 99, 6B9 P2d 1,237 1.984).
2L 208 Mont. 91, 676P.2d203 (1984).
22. 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.zd 7 65(1992).
23.2001MT 28, 304 Mont. 163, 19
P.3d 223.
24.2003 MT 97.
25. rd.
26. L76 Mont. 507, 580 P2d 114.
27.200t MT 28.
28. 178 Mont. 410,584P.2d1293 (1978).
29. 268 Mor.t. 137, 885 P.2d 5I5 G994).
30. 1998 MT 191, 290 Mont. t96,966
P.2d 1.12r.
31. 725 N.E. 2d1.1e3 (7999).
32.2003 MT 98.
33. 243 lr/lont. 284,794 P.zd 682 (1990).
34. 246 F.3d.1150 (9tlr Cir. 2001).
35.2003 MT 98.
36 . 248 tr/.olat. 52r , Bt3 P.2d 429 (1991) .
37 . 2003 MT 98.
38. Mont. Code Ann. $27-8-313.
39. Schermer, sùprâ 1r.. 7, at $29.08.
40. Moit. Code Arur. $ 27-8-313.
41. \Xiindt, srçra n. 1.9, at $ 9:24; Ostrager
and Newtran, supra n, 11, at $5.05þ).
42. Schermer, suprâ 11. 7, at $29.08.
43. 6e3 P.2d7e6 (1985).
44. 224 Morrt. 350, 7 30 P.2d 1115 (1986).
45.222 Mont. 399,722P.2d 628 (198ó)
46. Mont. Code Am. $33-18-201.
47. 1,999 MT 312,297 Mo¡tt. 243,992
P2d,237.
"!!e wouldn't tell gou or angone that the reason to pass
tort reform *orld be to l..du". ínsurance rates."
-.flr.rru, Jogce, fresíJent o{ the /nerícan þrt ftefor. ,{ssocíatíon,
as quoted ín "$ndg fí"Jt No LnL b.tween þrt fteforrt und
fnrrrunc. ftttes," Líabílítg ltl/""L, Jrþ 12, t922.
Pnce 44 Tnr¡.r TnBNos - Suvrrvrpn 2003
